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Military Strategy of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War

Vanshika Sirohi

Edited by: Aryan Gupta

About the Author

Vanshika Sirohi is a postgraduate student at the Jindal School of International Affairs and is a research intern at the Centre for Security Studies, JSIA.

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Background

Russia and Ukraine have had a tempestuous history together. They both have similar cultural origins. Both countries assert that Kievan Rus', a regime that unified the majority of the Eastern Slavic tribes and some Finnic tribes and embraced Byzantine Orthodoxy in the ninth to eleventh centuries, is where they derive their ancestry from. The histories of the people living in the lands of Russia and Ukraine diverged after the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus'. All of the remaining northern provinces of Rus were merged under the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which later became the Russian state. But as the time passed, both nations came to have an unmistakable culture and political identities. Despite Kyiv's opposition to Moscow's attempts to impose its authority over the country, Moscow has maintained that Ukraine has always been a part of Russia. This is evident from Vladimir Putin's essay titled, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", where he speaks of his confidence about the true sovereignty of Ukraine being possible only in partnership with Russia.¹

Nevertheless, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union for more than seven decades despite the hostility between the two countries. Several times over the past 20 years, Kyiv has accused Moscow of interference in its internal affairs.² Over the last three decades, Ukrainian civic identity has grown significantly, particularly in the years following the 2014 "Revolution of Dignity" and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas. This Ukrainian civic nation includes not only Ukrainian speakers in the west, but also a sizable portion of the primarily Russian-speaking but increasingly multilingual east.³ Even as Putin's Russia clings to quasi-imperial great-power fantasies, a generation has grown up in an independent Ukraine that, despite flaws, has retained a strong democracy and is becoming more European in its outlook (due in large part to Russia's aggressive intervention). If anything, the current conflict has widened the gap between Ukrainian and Russian identities while also strengthening ties between Ukrainians from various geographical, lingual, and

¹ Putin, Vladimir. "Vladimir Putin 'on the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.'" President of Russia, July 12, 2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181#sel=87:1:Ljl,87:96:yxj>.

² Zinets, Natalia. "Ukraine Security Service Accuses Russia of Meddling in Election." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 21, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-russia-idUSKCN1QA1OW>.

³ Walker, Shaun. "Enemy Tongue: Eastern Ukrainians Reject Their Russian Birth Language." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, June 4, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/enemy-tongue-eastern-ukrainians-reject-their-russian-birth-language>.

religious backgrounds. Regardless of what occurs on the battlefield, Russia's attempt to impose protracted dominance over its neighbour will almost certainly fail.

The Ukrainian public is significantly more opposed to Russia, and while Ukrainian forces are no match for their Russian counterparts, they are more capable than they were in 2014.⁴ Due to heavy losses incurred during the invasion, of Russian popular backlash is increasingly likely. A sustained occupation of even a small portion of Ukraine is costly and terrible. Russia's experience backing proxies in Donbas, where the economy has collapsed and the people have become poor,⁵ should serve as a warning about the responsibilities it would assume. If Russia does consider military action, a smaller operation is more likely. The possible goals of such an operation are to take Mariupol, a crucial industrial hub in the Donbas, or to extend the separatists' area of control to blockade it. Such an assault will weaken Zelenskyy and frighten the West. However, this strategy could potentially backfire, giving the Ukrainian president more leverage by enhancing his domestic appeal and bringing him closer to Western capitals.

Support from the West

Beginning in mid-May 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) began receiving significant supplies of American and Western artillery weapons, specifically the American M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition. Since the UAF has reported a shortage of ammunition and spare parts for its Soviet/Russian artillery systems,⁶ security support has been essential to maintaining UAF operations and reducing the Russian advantage in artillery and rocket weapons. However, despite waiting for new Western weapons, the majority of UAF units continue to use outdated Soviet/Russian systems due to training requirements and the strong demand for systems.

⁴ “How Ukraine's Armed Forces Shape up against Russia's.” The Economic Times, February 24, 2022. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/how-ukraines-armed-forces-shape-up-against-russias/articleshow/89791866.cms?from=mdr>.

⁵ Kirby, Paul. “Donbas: Why Russia Is Trying to Capture Eastern Ukraine.” BBC News. BBC, May 26, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544>.

⁶ Kosher, Isobel. “We're Almost out of Ammunition and Relying on Western Arms, Says Ukraine.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, June 10, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/were-almost-out-of-ammunition-and-relying-on-western-arms-says-ukraine>.

The M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) provided by the US in July,⁷ significantly improved the UAF's targeting capabilities by increasing range and precision accuracy.

The UAF is deploying these systems effectively, according to early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers, particularly to target important Russian command and control, logistical, and transport facilities.⁸ The UAF's massive collection of Western systems, each with its own set of operational norms and specifications, provides a huge maintenance and repair burden.

Private enterprises also responded. Microsoft worked closely with the Ukrainian government, cybersecurity experts from foreign governments, and private sector organisations before and after the Russian invasion to identify and address Russian threat activity against Ukrainian networks. In January 2022, the Ukrainian government was made aware of the presence of Wiper malware in over a dozen Ukrainian networks by the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre. In order to support Ukrainian efforts to recognize as well as counter cyberattacks linked to Russia, throughout the war, Microsoft established a secure line of communication with Ukrainian cyber officials. They are now able to share real-time threat information and offer technical support.⁹

Microsoft assisted Ukraine in running endpoint detection and response programs and collaborated with Ukrainian government representatives to enable the Microsoft Defender feature known as controlled folder access. Elon Musk's SpaceX also activated Starlink in Ukraine and sent more network terminals, including over 10,000 dish antennas. Starlink is a satellite internet constellation that uses cutting-edge satellites in low earth orbit to provide high-speed, low-latency broadband internet. The Ukrainian military was able to conduct advanced intelligence gathering and fire support operations against Russian positions because of Starlink. A 23-inch-wide receiver dish that needed to be mounted outside was a common component of the Starlink kits donated to

⁷ France-Presse, Agence. "Himars: What Are the Advanced Rockets Us Is Sending Ukraine?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, June 1, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/01/himars-what-are-the-advanced-rockets-us-is-sending-ukraine>.

⁸ Congress. Russia's war in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence aspects, September 14, 2022. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068>.

⁹ Siddiqui, Zeba. "Microsoft Says Ukraine, Poland Targetted with Novel Ransomware Attack." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, October 14, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/microsoft-says-ukraine-poland-targetted-with-novel-ransomware-attack-2022-10-14/>.

Ukraine. They also frequently came with a cord that connected to a basic router that sent out a Wi-Fi internet signal. Russian efforts to jam signals, obstruct the internet, and compromise Ukrainian command and control capabilities were thwarted in part thanks to Starlink.¹⁰

Ukraine still places a high focus on air defence. Even with a massive air force, the Russians have never been able to dominate the skies over Ukraine. According to the senior defence official, Ukrainian aircraft and air defence forces have made it too risky for Russian aircraft to fly, which has altered the nature of combat in the nation.

Tensions are anticipated to increase between Russia and adjacent NATO members due to the partnership's security commitments, which are likely to involve the US. To comprehend the requirements of the nation, the United States and its allies will maintain an intense and open discussion with their counterparts in Ukraine.¹¹

Counterattacks by Ukraine

Ukraine's military resistance has surprised and impressed many observers and analysts.¹² Despite having a smaller military than Russia, as well as a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in equipment and resources, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have proven to be resilient and adaptable. The UAF has shown greater adaptability and willingness to adapt to changing conditions than the Russian military, allowing it to exploit Russian mistakes and weaknesses.¹³

¹⁰ Ians. "Russia Trying to Kill Starlink Internet Services in Ukraine: Musk." Business Standard News. Business Standard, October 15, 2022. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/russia-trying-to-kill-starlink-internet-services-in-ukraine-musk-122101500297_1.html.

¹¹ Crowley, Michael, and Anton Troianovski. "U.S.-Russia Talks on Ukraine: U.S. Will Reply to Russian Demands as Military Buildups Continue around Ukraine." The New York Times. The New York Times, March 20, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/01/21/world/russia-us-ukraine>.

¹² Dickinson, Peter. "Generation Ua: Young Ukrainians Are Driving the Resistance to Russia's War." Atlantic Council, August 11, 2022. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/generation-ua-young-ukrainians-are-driving-the-resistance-to-russias-war/>.

¹³ Larson, Caleb. 2022. "How Putin and Russia Lost Big in Ukraine." *The National Interest*. The Center for the National Interest. September 22. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-putin-and-russia-lost-big-ukraine-204934>.

The UAF also has gained from high levels of motivation and recruitment as well as notable Western security assistance and training. Initially, Russian soldiers moved without enough convoy protection or logistical support, so the UAF traded space to encircle them. Ukraine prioritized guerrilla tactics, such as hit-and-run attacks or ambushes, to disrupt supply lines as Russian soldiers advanced.¹⁴ In an effort to exhaust and weaken Russian forces, Ukraine also isolated Russian battalions. To stall Russian advancements and neutralize Russian advantages like airpower, Ukraine used vital capabilities (such as the TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle for strikes and targeting), security aid, and artillery. Weapon systems that were quick to deploy, such as domestic and foreign anti-tank and anti-air systems, were successful in causing casualties in Russian people and equipment.¹⁵ A diffused command structure appears to have been established by the UAF, allowing each operational command to cooperate and carry out operations with due regard to the situations in that region.

To undermine Russian capabilities and prevent Russian soldiers from being resupplied in Kherson, the UAF launched strikes across Kherson and Crimea, including assaults on strategic logistics sites and bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of occupied southern Ukraine.¹⁶ Ukraine carried out more than 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8, according to General Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States.¹⁷ By focusing on previously inaccessible stockpiles, these attacks certainly severely strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply.

¹⁴ Dickinson, Peter. 2021. "Guerrilla Tactics Offer Ukraine's Best Deterrent against Putin's Invasion Force." *Atlantic Council*. December 8. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/guerrilla-tactics-offer-ukraines-best-chance-against-putins-invasion-force/>.

¹⁵ Bowen, Andrew S. 2022. "CRS Reports - Congress." Accessed November 3. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/>.

¹⁶ Al Jazeera. "Russian Forces Hold the Line in Kherson as Ukraine Counterstrikes." *Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera*. Al Jazeera, October 16, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/16/russian-forces-hold-the-line-in-kherson-as-ukraine-counterstrikes>.

¹⁷ Reuters. "Ukraine Has Struck More than 400 Russian Targets with Himars - U.S. Top ..." Accessed November 3, 2022. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-09-08/ukraine-has-struck-more-than-400-russian-targets-with-himars-u-s-top-general>.

On its MiG-29 fighters, the UAF also placed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), which are used to hit radar or electronic warfare installations.¹⁸ In anticipation of a UAF onslaught, Russian forces seemed to move from Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine. Observers had been following reports of Ukrainian offensive preparation for months, but they questioned whether the UAF had enough trained personnel and equipment (such as tanks and armoured vehicles to swiftly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations. They also considered the possibility that by diverting resources to one front, the UAF might expose other fronts to a Russian counterattack.¹⁹

Air Defence

Ukraine still places a high focus on air defence. Even with a massive air force, the Russians have never been able to dominate the skies over Ukraine. According to the senior defence official, Ukrainian aircraft and air defence forces have made it too risky for Russian aircraft to fly, which has altered the nature of combat in the nation.

However, air defence is not inexpensive. It is safe to conclude that a number of missiles were fired for every missile or aircraft that was shot down. The objective for Ukraine is to maintain these supplies and improve the integration of the air defence picture. This was discussed at the most recent Ukraine Defence Contact Group conference in Brussels, and the US is working with a number of allies and partners to provide Kyiv with these capabilities.

War at Sea

¹⁸ Mizokami, Kyle. “Ukraine Somehow Slapped U.S. Anti-Radar Missiles onto MiG-29 Fighter Jets.” Popular Mechanics. Popular Mechanics, September 7, 2022. <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41033452/ukraine-puts-harm-missiles-on-mig-29-fighter-jets/>.

¹⁹ Stepanenko, Kateryna. “Ukraine Conflict Updates.” Institute for the Study of War. Accessed November 3, 2022. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates>.

In a protracted fight, a maritime power is more likely to win. As the maritime aspect of the conflict intensifies, the West's command of the sea, dominance of relevant maritime forums such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and influence over powerful insurance brokers and shipping companies may ultimately prove fatal to Putin's war. Russia, like its predecessor, the Soviet Union, lacks a marine perspective, which prevents Moscow from comprehending the strategic significance of sea power beyond its direct naval superiority in the Black Sea.²⁰

On the ground, Ukraine is just as strong as Russia. Putin, however, must contend with a coalition of maritime nations, most of which are western, that uphold freedom of navigation, have condescending navies, and have a large impact on international maritime affairs. This enables the west to gradually strangle Putin's dictatorship with strategic sea power. The embargo of Ukraine, which limits the delivery of grain and other agricultural commodities to underdeveloped countries, has resulted in a global food catastrophe. This has demonstrated how important navigational freedom is.

The benefits, such as preventing a potential Russian referendum and the annexation of occupied territories, were probably taken into account by Ukraine. It also took into account the winter and potential problems caused by Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas. Russian forces are off-balance and losing ground as a result of the Ukrainian tactic of simultaneously invading in the east and the south.²¹ The majority of Ukrainian victories to date have been in the east and northeast, including driving out Russian troops from the Donetsk region's Lyman town a day after Russian President Vladimir V. Putin annexed the town and its surroundings to Russia.

The new strategy has worked particularly successfully in the southern province of Kherson, where Ukrainian officials have been launching their counteroffensive for weeks. It is particularly vulnerable compared to other seized cities as it depends on four bridges crossing the Dnieper River

²⁰ Germond, Basil. "Ukraine War: As the Conflict at Sea Intensifies, Russia's Prospects of Victory Look Further off than Ever Basil Germond." *The Conversation*, October 6, 2022. <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-as-the-conflict-at-sea-intensifies-russias-prospects-of-victory-look-further-off-than-ever-185640>.

²¹ Bowen, Andrew S. 2022. "CRS Reports - Congress." Accessed November 3. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/>.

for supplies.²² The tactic appears to be having some success. The Ukrainian military hasn't gained much ground in terms of territory but it has managed to halt the Russian advance across the nation for the time being and stop the heavy losses the country had been taking in recent months, which had caused morale to dip and some soldiers to even desert their platoons.

Ukraine's counteroffensive strategy's execution has 3 major pillars which made it successful:

1. Deception

Modern warfare is fought in an era of open-source intelligence, in which politicians, soldiers, and civilians are always under fire from social media posts, commercial satellite images, and other sources. Large military formations are becoming more and more difficult to conceal due to the deluge of information, if not impossible. However, Ukrainians have demonstrated to the rest of the world that the use of deception is still possible in today's highly connected information environment.

The counteroffensive developed by Ukraine's military planners was based on antiquated ideas that had been modernised. They use a variation of the military term "central position" from the 19th century.²³ Napoleon is thought to have introduced this idea when he placed his forces between two opposing armies to divide the enemy. As a result, the French commander was able to concentrate his troops despite being outnumbered.

Ukraine employed a pivotal position in the recent counteroffensive to combat two Russian military concentrations, one in the east between Kharkiv and the Donbas region, that includes parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, and another in the south near the Dnieper River and Kherson. Together, these Russian forces outnumbered the Ukrainian army and had more tanks, armoured vehicles,

²² Dangwal, Ashish. "Ukraine Strikes Another Russian Bridge after Kerch & This Time with HIMARS MLRS in Kherson Region." Latest Asian, Middle-East, EurAsian, Indian News, October 23, 2022. <https://eurasianimes.com/not-only-kerch-ukraine-now-strikes-another-bridge-with-himars/>.

²³ Jensen, Benjamin. "Ukraine's Success Shows Mastery of 3 Essential Skills of Modern Warfare." Defense One. The Conversation, September 18, 2022. <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/09/ukraines-success-shows-mastery-3-essential-skills-modern-warfare/377281/>.

artillery, and attack aircraft.²⁴ Although Ukraine was increasing its military presence in Kherson in the south and isolating Russian troops by attacking infrastructure with rocket artillery, sabotage, and unconventional warfare, it also kept a sizable, armoured force in the east. Ukraine was able to hold back Russian forces on one front while launching an attack on another one because to this. Russia had to consider the risk of an invasion from Ukrainian forces coming from either direction because of Ukraine's strategic location. Ukraine also used a crafty ruse that incorporated components of the so-called "Magruder's Principle."²⁵ According to this axiom, it is simpler to persuade a target to cling to an old belief than to accept a new one.

Ukraine affirmed Russian perceptions that Kherson would be the primary target of the counteroffensive's opening attack by executing strikes that isolated Russian units along the Dnieper River and making public declarations that implied Ukraine would attack Kherson. This tactic of using public pronouncements and actions to influence an opponent's judgments is also congruous with the antiquated Soviet idea of "reflexive control," that employs disinformation to distort the target's perception of reality and induce them to make self-defeating choices. Russia consequently deployed troops to the south to reinforce its defensive positions in Kherson.²⁶ Moscow's eastern forces were probably hollowed out as a result, and its capacity to use reserves was also hampered.

2. Precision Strikes

Ukraine has demonstrated a mastery of deploying precision strikes to obstruct the movement of Russian soldiers on a more tactical level. To put pressure on Russian ground forces, Kyiv has used

²⁴ Philip, Snehes Alex. "How 'Graveyard' of Russian Tanks in Ukraine Is Upending Armour Doctrines Worldwide & for India." ThePrint, October 30, 2022. <https://theprint.in/defence/how-graveyard-of-russian-tanks-in-ukraine-is-upending-armour-doctrines-worldwide-for-india/1184383/>.

²⁵ Jensen, Benjamin. "Magruder's Principle: The Rapid Advance by Ukraine against Russia Shows Its Skill in Modern Warfare." The Milwaukee Independent, September 20, 2022. <https://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/syndicated/magruders-principle-rapid-advance-ukraine-russia-shows-skill-modern-warfare/>.

²⁶ AP, AP. "Russia Reinforces Military, Expands Kherson EvacuationsAP." Return to frontpage, November 1, 2022. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/russia-reinforces-military-expands-kherson-evacuations/article66083660.ece>.

a combination of anti-tank guided missiles, conventional armoured formations, and artillery, as well as swarms of "loitering munitions" - airborne drones that find and then attack targets.

As a result, the nation's airplanes, special operations forces, and long-range precision missiles are now free to search for Russian radars, command centres, and supply depots. As a result, Russian forces have encountered numerous challenges and have struggled to amass enough fighting capability to launch a counterattack and stop the Ukrainian advance.²⁷

The complex system of war is more controlled by power rules than by linear dynamics. This means that a smaller, more mobile force, like the Ukrainians, can overcome more powerful forces. Shock and dislocation were caused by the Ukrainian counteroffensive's tactical approach and simultaneity. By disseminating pictures of soldiers fleeing, information operations exacerbated this effect and made defection and surrender contagious.²⁸

3. Politics

Clausewitz once said and I quote, "war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means."²⁹ War is more than just a political act; it is also a legitimate political tool for carrying out political trade in a new way.

The timing and setting of Ukraine's most recent counteroffensive were determined by a political timeline. To prevent Russia from using the same strategy it utilised to annex the territory of Ukraine in 2014 through the Minsk accord, Kyiv needs to prevent it from holding an unlawful referendum in Kherson and on occupied territory in the east.

²⁷ Bacheaga, Hugo. "Ukraine Counter-Offensive: Russian Forces Retreat as Ukraine Takes Key Towns." BBC News. BBC, September 10, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62860774>.

²⁸ Mizokami, Kyle. "Ukraine Somehow Slapped U.S. Anti-Radar Missiles onto MiG-29 Fighter Jets." Popular Mechanics. Popular Mechanics, September 7, 2022. <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a41033452/ukraine-puts-harm-missiles-on-mig-29-fighter-jets/>.

²⁹ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1918.

Moscow planned to utilize the referendum to convince the Russian public that it had made progress since annexing Ukrainian territory. Putin was probably attempting to solidify territorial gains at the same time before splintering Western support for Kyiv with the coming threat of winter. In other words, the recent counteroffensive may have made it more difficult for Moscow to hold a vote in the seized area even if it had not gained a significant amount of land or routed entire Russian divisions. Instead of safeguarding polling places, Russian forces would be compelled to defend the front.

Therefore, while the counteroffensive's operational and tactical successes are significant, Ukraine's overarching strategic goal still revolves around politics. Despite the counteroffensive's success, this political logic raises questions about the likelihood that Russian forces will be decisively defeated on the battlefield shortly. Even if Ukraine makes big progress in the south and retakes Kherson, Moscow can still choose to mobilize heavily and carry on the conflict until either Russian elites or the populace turn against Putin and his inner circle.

Issues faced by Ukraine in Defensive and Offensive Strategies

During the battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, the UAF sustained significant losses, especially among seasoned skilled who volunteered for the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) and reserve troops.³⁰ To lead small-scale counterattacks and support TDF and Reserve units manning defensive positions, the UAF dispersed the manoeuvre formation's core into smaller units. In defence, this has resulted in these forces' respectable fighting performance, per a RUSI study. However, the Ukrainian armed forces have determined that it is important to reunite their strongest troops and use them to lead attacks for the attack. As Russian units regrouped, UAF forces

³⁰ Bowen, Andrew S. 2022. "CRS Reports - Congress." Accessed November 3. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/>.

concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled regions of the Donbas, slowing down many UAF counteroffensives, such as those outside of Kharkiv. TDF units were left behind.³¹

Secure communications, instances of command-and-control problems between the TDF and regular military, a pressing need for artillery and heavy weapon support, and all these problems plagued the UAF. Instead of executing a planned withdrawal, the UAF persisted in resolutely defending territory, which led some observers to conclude that Ukraine's goal was to cause as much attrition on Russian soldiers as possible.

Energy prices and security of supply

Energy prices in the EU and around the world have risen significantly since the second half of 2021. As a result of Russia's inappropriate and illegal behaviour towards Ukraine, gas prices have risen further, raising concerns about the security of the EU's energy supply. The decision by Russia to halt gas exports to several EU members has worsened the issue.³²

Gas Supply

On May 19, 2022, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement about a new regulation on gas storage that the European Commission had proposed in March of the same year. On June 27, 2022, the Council approved the regulations.³³ They want to ensure that the gas storage facilities owned by EU member states are fully stocked before the upcoming winter season, so that they can be shared with those member states that do not have storage facilities.

³¹ Glantz, Mary. "How Ukraine's Counteroffensives Managed to Break the War's Stalemate." United States Institute of Peace, September 21, 2022. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/how-ukraines-counteroffensives-managed-break-wars-stalemate>.

³² "Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on the Markets: Eu Response." Consilium, October 25, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/>.

³³ Ibid.

Food Markets

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has a direct impact on food security and affordability around the world. In the EU, the accessibility of food, feed, and fertilizer is not a huge tension because of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The EU is highly self-sufficient; thus it is possible to expect that the single market would show its usefulness in absorbing shocks and ensuring food security for EU inhabitants, and providing income support to European farmers.

Nonetheless, there have been some implications of the decrease in Ukrainian imports of maize, wheat, rapeseed, sunflower, and meal, primarily on feed prices and the EU food industry. The fundamental issue in the EU remains affordability as a result of high market rates and inflationary trends caused by the Ukrainian conflict.³⁴

Mobility of People and Goods

The movement of people and products across all modes of transportation in the EU has been significantly impacted by the invasion of Ukraine. The central challenges include fuel availability and growing fuel prices, as well as logistical challenges associated with border crossings and airspace restrictions.³⁵ Furthermore, the industry is facing new operational challenges as a result of increased imports of goods and a significant influx of Ukrainian refugees into EU countries.

Member states have taken several actions to show solidarity with Ukrainian refugees, including allowing humanitarian aid to pass through and constructing transport and information centres at major border crossings. Nearly five million Ukrainian refugees have emigrated to the EU and other OECD nations since Russia started its war of aggression in February 2022.³⁶

³⁴ World Bank Group. "Russian Invasion of Ukraine Impedes Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery in Emerging Europe and Central Asia." World Bank. World Bank Group, October 4, 2022. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/10/04/russian-invasion-of-ukraine-impedes-post-pandemic-economic-recovery-in-emerging-europe-and-central-asia>.

³⁵ "Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on the Markets: Eu Response." Consilium, October 25, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/>.

³⁶ "Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine Generates Historic Migration Flows: More Support Needed for

The countries that have taken in the bulk of refugees are Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic (1.4 million, 1 million, and 400,000, respectively). Estonia and the Czech Republic have assimilated more refugees per thousand residents than any other countries, with Poland (36 per thousand), Lithuania (23 per thousand), and Latvia (20 per thousand) following closely.³⁷

Conclusion

The counteroffensive's success has shown that what is known in the military as "operational art," or the creative use of time, space, and forces to gain an advantage, can be more important than relative combat power and simply tallying the number of tanks and pieces of artillery that each side in a dispute possesses. There is hope for Ukraine as some observers think the tide has turned in its favour as the UAF retakes territory across the nation and the Russian military keeps moving out.³⁸ "For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that will remain in the enemy's hands," said Valery Zaluzhny, commander in chief of Ukraine, on September 7.³⁹ UAF soldiers continue to exhibit great levels of operational and tactical flexibility to maintain operations despite their inadequate equipment.

The UAF most certainly needs ongoing support to replace lost equipment and support the transfer to NATO-style weaponry as the fight moves from the Donbas to southern Ukraine. Large amounts of Russian ammo and weapons were taken by the UAF during the recent Kharkiv offensive in Ukraine, which can be utilized to restock UAF supplies. The UAF probably requires ammunition replenishment, support and advice with equipment maintenance and repair, and ongoing personnel

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³⁷ "War in Ukraine: Tackling the Policy Challenges Ahead." OECD, May 27, 2022. <https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/en/>.

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training because the conflict has used up a large amount of ammunition. Additionally, Ukraine continues to benefit from many volunteers, and foreign assistance for training will probably provide Ukraine an upper hand in terms of human resources while Russia continues to have difficulties filling positions.

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